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Abstract 
The present study investigated the relationship between category extension and intension for 
eleven different semantic categories. It is often tacitly assumed that there is a (strong) 
extension-intension link. However, a recent study by Hampton and Passanisi (2016) 
examining the patterns of stable individual differences in concepts across participants called 
this hypothesis into question. To conceptually replicate their findings, two studies were 
conducted. We employed a category judgment task to measure category extensions, whereas a 
property generation (in Study 1) and property judgment task (Study 2) were used to measure 
intensions. Using their method, that is, correlating extension and intension similarity matrices, 
we found non-significant correlations in both studies, supporting their conclusion that 
similarity between individuals for extensional judgments does not map onto similarity 
between individuals for intensional judgments. However, multi-level logistic regression 
analyses showed that the properties a person generated (Study 1) or endorsed (Study 2) better 
predicted her own category judgments compared to other people’s category judgments. This 
result provides evidence in favor of a link between extension and intension at the subject 
level. The conflicting findings, resulting from two different approaches, and their theoretical 
repercussions are discussed. 
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Introduction 
In studies of natural concepts, many theories have claimed that in order to categorize, 
people may recognize objects as having shared properties with other objects, and as a result 
group these objects together into the same category. For instance, if you encounter a novel 
object that has fur, four legs, a tail, and barks, you might compare it with objects that you 
know have similar properties, and then you could group this novel object together with other 
similar objects, in this case into the category of dogs. This example shows that concepts have 
two important aspects that play a role in categorization: the intension (the properties that 
define concepts) and the extension (the set of category members)1.  
It has been a long-held belief that category extension and intension are somehow 
related (e.g., Aristotle, 4th century BC/1961; Frege, 1948; for a recent overview see Hampton 
& Passanisi, 2016). As proposed by property-based models (Hampton, 1979; Rosch, 1975; 
Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974), the world is divided into natural 
categories that are structured by clusters of properties. People use these properties to make 
predictions and to draw inferences in deciding whether an object is a member of a category. 
Thus, an object will be grouped into a certain category if it has necessary and sufficient 
properties (i.e., the classical view) or shares certain properties with other members in the 
category (i.e., the probabilistic view, Smith & Medin, 1981). Such property-based models 
have been used in numerous studies of categorization, many of which conclude or assume that 
category extension and intension are closely related (e.g., Ameel, Malt, & Storms, 2014; 
Caplan & Barr, 1989; Hampton, Dubois, & Yeh, 2006; Murphy, 2002; Verheyen, De Deyne, 
Dry, & Storms, 2011).  
 
                                                          
1 In philosophical semantics, the terms extension and intension refer to different sides of the same coin (i.e., they 
map to each other by definition). Here we follow the psychological literature in which extension usually refers to 
the list of category members that people endorse, whereas intension refers to the properties that they believe define 
concepts.  
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Moving in the opposite direction: Intension is not everything 
 Besides properties as the intensional information, other researchers focused on 
similarity to stored exemplars of categories in predicting category membership (Heit & 
Barsalou, 1996; Nosofsky, 1984). Storms, De Boeck, and Ruts (2000), for instance, found an 
exemplar-based model to be a better predictor of category membership than a property-based 
model.  Furthermore, other studies have found that the relationship between extensions and 
intensions is not as direct as some have claimed. Malt, Sloman, Gennari, Shi, and Wang 
(1999) studied the names of containers in three different languages and argued that 
categorization can also be influenced by the linguistic and cultural histories of the language 
itself. More specifically, they proposed three mechanisms (i.e., chaining, convention, and pre-
emption) that explain why properties alone may be insufficient for capturing the complexity 
of naming choices. These mechanisms may explain why object clustering is not solely based 
on a particular set of properties (see also Ameel, Malt, & Storms, 2008). 
There are also accounts that presume a reverse relationship between exemplars and 
properties (Spalding & Gagné, 2013). In this view, category membership is a given rather 
than guided by the properties an exemplar possesses. Common or defining properties of a 
concept are derived from the exemplars of the category2. Despite their differences, all of these 
theories would expect some kind of (causal) relationship between category extension and 
intension. 
 However, Hampton and Passanisi (2016, henceforth H&P) recently called this 
assumption into question, suggesting instead that in one important respect intension might not 
map onto extension at all. They reasoned that if there is an intension-extension link 
(dis)similarity between individuals in terms of their category intensions should translate to 
(dis)similarity in their category extensions. Using a property importance rating task to 
                                                          
2 We thank Thomas Spalding for bringing this to our attention. 
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measure category intensions and a typicality judgment task for category extensions, H&P 
examined whether individual variation in the representation of category extensions indeed 
maps to inter-individual variability in category intensions. That is, if two persons show 
similar typicality judgments, H&P argued that their judgments of property importance should 
also be similar. Conversely, if two persons weight properties differently, the idea is that their 
category extension (i.e., typicality ratings) should also diverge to a certain extent. For 
instance, if person A considers physical activity to be an important property of sport, whereas 
person B considers having rules to be more important, one would expect their typicality 
judgments to vary correspondingly. That is, hiking would be a more typical sport for person 
A, whereas snooker would be a more typical sport for person B. Analogously, if person A and 
C both consider physical activity to be an important property of sport, one would expect 
similar typicality ratings for hiking (i.e., relatively high ratings) and snooker (relatively low 
ratings).  
To formally test this prediction, they constructed two similarity matrices for 
participants, one for extensions (i.e., consisting of all pairwise correlations between 
participants’ typicality judgments) and a second one for intensions (i.e., consisting of all 
pairwise correlations between the same participants’ property importance judgments). They 
then correlated these similarity matrices from the two tasks to test whether there is a relation 
between extensional and intensional representations. Across four studies (with slight 
variations in the methodology), they came to the conclusion that similarity between 
individuals in extensional judgments did not map onto similarity between individuals in 
intensional judgments. Estimates of the correlation between similarity matrices were close to 
zero in spite of test-retest reliability correlations for both matrices obtained in two of the 
studies of around .35, significantly above zero. Put differently, their results contradict the 
widely accepted view that intensions map to extensions. H&P proposed instead that category 
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intension and extension are not integrated, but rather that they are stored independently from 
each other. More concretely, there might be an exemplar-based system underlying extensional 
judgments (see e.g., Storms, De Boeck, & Ruts, 2000) and a theory/schema-driven system 
underlying intensional judgments. Such a hybrid form of concept representation can account 
for H&P’s findings by assuming that the typicality and property importance judgments tap 
into different systems, which are stored separately in semantic memory.  
 H&P’s conclusions have far-reaching repercussions for theories of concept 
representation and category learning, because most theories assume there is a link between 
intension and extension. Hence, the first aim of this paper is to conceptually replicate their 
findings. An important difference from H&P’s experiments is that we employed a category 
judgment task to measure category extensions, and a property generation task (Study 1) and 
property judgment task (Study 2) to measure category intensions. Besides testing whether 
H&P’s findings generalize to other, related measures, we used category judgments instead of 
typicality ratings to address the concern raised by H&P that different properties may 
determine category membership as opposed to typicality judgments (for some concepts). 
Indeed, they speculated that “judgments of feature importance might reflect involvement in 
category membership decisions rather than typicality, so that variability in the two measures 
would not match up” (p. 507). The present set-up allows us to test this possibility. 
A second goal is to compare H&P’s approach with a more direct method to link 
people’s intensions and extensions. Indeed, their (controversial) conclusion might find its 
roots in the nature of the methodology they used. To address this (potential) concern, we used 
a more straightforward measure of the extension-intension relation inspired by Hampton 
(1979). More concretely, we will examine whether a participant’s own properties predict her 
category judgments better than the properties of another participant. 
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Study 1 
Method 
 Ethics statement. All research was conducted with the approval of the Social and 
Societal Ethics Committee (SMEC) of the University of Leuven. Written informed consent 
was obtained from all participants before starting the task. 
Participants. Sixteen adults (8 females); ranging in age from 20 to 46 years old (Mage 
= 26.83) performed both a property generation task and a category judgment task. Another 
group of 16 adults (10 females), ranging in age from 20 to 55 years old (Mage = 30.42) 
performed a property applicability judgment task.  
Materials. The stimuli were sets of 15 possible exemplars from each of 8 semantic 
categories. Inspired by Ameel et al. (2008), the categories were chosen in pairs of a 
superordinate (high) level and a corresponding basic (low) level category (specifically, 
clothes-trousers; fruit-berries; musical instruments-guitars; vehicles-bicycles). The exemplars 
were presented in the form of pictures in both the category membership judgment and 
property applicability judgment tasks, whereas in the property generation task only the 
category names were presented. Within each set of 15 items, ten were presumed category 
members and five were presumed non-members (based on discussions of the selected 
materials by two of the authors). Each picture was printed in color on a 11x10 cm cardboard 
form. Figure 1 displays some of the stimuli (see Appendix for all items). Note that there are 
two primary differences with H&P’s study in terms of the materials used: H&P only selected 
superordinate categories, some of which were of a non-physical nature (i.e., sports and 
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science) and the exemplars were presented in the form of words instead of pictures. However, 
these variations from H&P’s study were not theoretically motivated. 
 
 
Figure 1. Sample of the stimuli used in Study 1. From the top left to the bottom right: 
category clothes, fruit, musical instruments, vehicles, trousers, berries, guitars, and bicycles. 
 
Procedure. In a first phase of the study, participants completed the property 
generation task and then continued to the category membership judgment task, within a single 
session. The task order assured that participants’ generated properties were not influenced by 
the pictures. That is, participants only saw the pictures in the category membership judgment 
task. In a second phase of the study, a different group of participants performed the property 
applicability judgment task, which involved the properties gathered in the first phase of the 
experiment (i.e., in the property generation task).  
In the property generation task, participants were given a MS Excel file that contained 
eight worksheets, one for each category name. Participants were asked to imagine they had to 
explain the terms to someone who did not know their meaning. They performed the task 
individually by typing in the properties. They were instructed to finish one category before 
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moving on to the next one. The categories were presented in different random orders to each 
participant with superordinate and basic category pairs (e.g., clothes-trousers) never occurring 
immediately one after the other.  
After completing the property generation task, participants were given a link to an 
online survey (i.e., the category membership judgment task) where each set of 15 pictures was 
presented and they were asked to click on the pictures of exemplars they judged to be 
members of the category mentioned above the picture set. Each category name was embedded 
in a question, for instance, “which pictures below are members of the category fruit?” The 
category name was written in bold and underlined. All 15 pictures were presented in three 
rows of five, so that participants could see all the pictures on their computer screen at the 
same time. Participants were also always able to see the target category name when they were 
selecting pictures. Before moving on to the next category, participants were asked to check 
whether they were sure of their answers. If they did, they were allowed to click the ‘next’ 
button to continue to the next category. In the survey, each participant received a different 
random order of the categories and pictures. 
To select the properties for the property applicability judgment task, we followed the 
procedure described in McRae, de Sa, and Seidenberg (1997). First, all generated properties 
were simply tallied for each category name. Synonym properties (i.e., properties that have 
essentially the same meaning, e.g., to produce music and to make music) were given an 
identical code. Properties phrased with an adjective-noun combination (e.g., heavy iron) and 
conjunctive properties (e.g., red and small) were split and treated as separate properties if 
they provided different information. Redundant quantifiers (e.g., most of them) were dropped 
and properties which only mention exemplars of the category (e.g., apple for the category 
fruit) were eliminated. The total number of properties (i.e., the number of types, not tokens) 
generated across participants for each category ranged from 39 to 53 (see Table 1 for the 
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average number of tokens of generated properties per category). In a next step, the 15 possible 
exemplars per category were combined with the generated category properties to form 
property by exemplar matrices. Thus, every matrix consisted of 15 columns, one for every 
exemplar, and 39 to 53 rows, one for every generated property. 
 
Table 1 
Mean and standard deviation of number of generated properties and category judgement 
scores for each category in Study 1. 
 Generated properties Category judgments 
M SD M SD 
Clothes 8.69 4.06 0.66 0.13 
Fruit 8.50 4.73 0.70 0.06 
Musical instruments 7.13 4.51 0.70 0.08 
Vehicles 8.13 3.36 0.64 0.15 
Trousers 8.81 4.17 0.62 0.13 
Berries 8.81 3.99 0.54 0.18 
Guitars 8.06 4.58 0.61 0.18 
Bicycles 9.94 5.85 0.63 0.10 
M 8.51 4.41 0.64 0.13 
 
In the property applicability judgment task, a different group of participants 
individually received an excel file in which they indicated whether the exemplars possessed 
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the properties by entering a 1 if the property applied to the exemplar, or a 0 if not. Each 
participant was randomly assigned to fill in the matrices for two categories. In total, four 
participants were assigned to each category. All the tasks were conducted in Dutch and none 
of the tasks had a time limit. 
 
Results 
 The results are structured as follows. First, we will describe the intensional and 
extensional measures and explain how these were transformed into similarity matrices. Then, 
we will test whether similarity between individuals for extensional judgments maps onto 
similarity between individuals for intensional judgments by correlating extension and 
intension similarity matrices (i.e., H&P’s approach). Finally, we will introduce a new method 
using an individual’s properties to predict her own category judgments and compare the 
results.  
Extension similarity matrix. The category judgments were first quantified by scoring 
each decision as 0 or 1, depending on whether the item was judged a non-member or a 
member of the category (see Table 1 for the mean and standard deviation of the category 
judgment scores, the proportion of yes responses, per category). These scores were then 
tabulated for each participant in each category. To measure between-participant consistency, 
Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients (Lord, Novick, & Birnbaum, 1968) were calculated 
for the category judgment scores. Agreement between people (and a large sample size) 
translates into a high alpha. The reliability coefficients obtained in the present study varied 
between .92 and .99 across the eight categories. For each category, a participant by participant 
(16x16) similarity matrix was then constructed with the correlations between participants’ 
category judgments. This matrix shows the similarity between all pairs of participants in their 
category judgments. 
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Intension similarity matrices. Based on the property generation task, we constructed 
two intension similarity matrices. The first one was a property overlap measure and the 
second one was derived from the property applicability scores.  
For the first matrix, property overlap scores were computed (see Tversky, 1977). That 
is, for every two participants and every category, the number of common properties (i.e., 
properties that were generated by both participants) was divided by the sum of common and 
distinctive properties (i.e., the number of unique properties from both participants). For each 
category, we then constructed a 16x16 similarity matrix with participants’ property overlap 
scores. This matrix will be termed the “property overlap similarity matrix”.  
For the second matrix, summed property applicability scores were computed for each 
exemplar separately for each participant based on the properties that she herself generated. 
The idea is that if an exemplar possesses many of the properties generated by person X (i.e., 
the exemplar has a high property applicability score), it is more likely to be included as a 
category member by that person. The procedure to calculate the property applicability scores 
is illustrated in Figure 2 for the category fruit (the same holds for the other seven categories). 
The applicability judgments (0 or 1) for each property × exemplar combination were first 
summed over the four participants who completed the property applicability judgment task, 
resulting in property applicability scores that ranged from 0 to 4. The Cronbach’s alpha 
reliability coefficient for these property applicability judgments varied between .78 and .90 
across the eight categories. Using the specific properties a participant generated (i.e., 
individual properties), summed property applicability scores were then calculated by adding 
the property applicability scores of the individual properties for each of the 15 exemplars 
separately. For instance, to calculate the summed property applicability score of the exemplar 
banana for participant X, the applicability scores for banana were summed across all the 
properties generated by participant X (see the vertical box under the exemplar banana in 
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Figure 2). This procedure was carried out for all the 15 exemplars separately and for every 
participant using her own individual properties. The result is a vector with 15 elements for 
each participant × category combination, representing the degree to which each exemplar 
possesses the properties generated by that participant. Finally, a 16x16 similarity matrix for 
participants was constructed using the correlations between participants’ summed property 
applicability scores. To avoid confusion, this matrix will be termed the “property applicability 
similarity matrix”. Thus, both the property applicability and the property overlap similarity 
matrices provide some insight into how similar or dissimilar participants are in terms of their 
category intensions3. 
                                                          
3 One could argue that property applicability similarity is an imperfect reflection of intensional similarity. Two 
people might generate completely different properties, yet if these yield similar amounts of evidence for a given 
set of exemplars belonging in the category, the property applicability scores could be strongly correlated. It 
should be noted that property applicability similarity does correlate reliably with property overlap similarity, as 
will be shown later.  
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Figure 2. Calculating the property applicability scores in Study 1. 
 
Correlation between similarity matrices. In order to discover whether there is a link 
between extension and intension, we correlated, for each category, the lower triangular 
extension similarity matrix with the corresponding property applicability and property overlap 
similarity matrices. Before extension and intension similarity matrices were correlated, the 
central tendency and variability of the similarities was checked. Table 2 shows the average of 
each of the three similarity measures per category, whereas Figure 3 shows the distribution of 
these measures across all eight categories. Because our data were non-normally distributed 
(with skewness of the similarities from the category judgment, property overlap, and property 
applicability matrices: -1.93, 1.00, and -1.17, respectively), we used Spearman’s non-
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parametric rank-order correlation to examine the correspondence between the extension and 
intension matrices4.  
 
Table 2 
Average of each of the three similarity measures per category in Study 1. 
 
Category judgments Property overlap Property applicability 
Clothes .68 .14 .69 
Fruit .80 .18 .56 
Musical instruments .81 .15 .66 
Vehicles .43 .13 .79 
Trousers .71 .17 .32 
Berries .50 .17 .33 
Guitars .46 .17 .30 
Bicycles .68 .16 .88 
M .63 .16 .57 
 
 
                                                          
4 All correlations used to construct similarity matrices are Pearson product-moment correlations. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of the similarity measures for each matrix in Study 1 (based on the 
category judgments, property overlap, and property applicability matrices), collapsed across 
the eight categories. Note that the category judgments and property applicability similarity 
measures are correlations, whereas property overlap is a proportion. 
 
For each category, we first calculated the correlations between the extension similarity 
matrix and the two different intension matrices (see the first and third columns of Table 3 
under the subheading “Within-category”). Collapsing across categories, the average 
correlations were close to zero: M = .03 for property applicability and M = -.07 for property 
overlap. Following H&P, we also correlated the extension similarity matrix from a particular 
category (e.g., clothes) with the intension matrices from the other seven categories (see 
columns with subheading “Between-category”). This procedure provides a control for non-
specific similarities in how people may be approaching each task. Mean correlations were 
very close to zero. Using independent samples t tests to compare the (Fisher’s Z transformed) 
eight within- and 56 between-category correlations, we found no significant difference for 
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category judgment – property applicability (p = .97) and category judgment - property overlap 
(p = .18). These results conceptually replicate H&P’s findings and might thus suggest that 
there is no clear link between people’s individual category extension and intension.  
 For completeness sake, Table 3 also shows the correlations between the two different 
intensional matrices. Seven of the 8 categories showed significant positive correlations, with a 
mean of .41. This result is to be expected, given how the matrices were constructed. 
 
Table 3 
Spearman rank-order correlations in Study 1 between similarity matrices for category 
judgments, property overlap, and property applicability. 
 Category judgments- 
Property overlap 
Category judgments - 
Property applicability 
Property overlap- 
Property applicability 
 Within-
category 
Between-
category 
Within-
category 
Between-
category 
Within-category 
Clothes  .05 -.02  .06 -.04 .39* 
Fruit -.13 -.04  .08  .05 .21* 
Musical instruments  .11  .00   .40*  .02 .16 
Vehicles -.03  .00  .02  .07 .58* 
Trousers -.18* -.03 -.17 -.01 .59* 
Berries -.08  .12 -.15  .13 .41* 
Guitars  .07 -.09  .03  .01 .48* 
Bicycles -.26*  .03 -.06 -.09 .50* 
M -.07  .00  .03  .02 .41 
*correlation is significant at the .05 level  
 
Predicting category judgments from individual properties. The previous analyses 
showed correlations between intension similarity matrices and extension similarity matrices 
that were close to zero. This could mean that participants’ category judgments were not based 
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on their own properties. It is, however, possible that properties from other participants contain 
useful information for the prediction of one’s own category judgment. In other words, it is 
feasible that people use properties in judging category membership that they do not come up 
with in a property generation task (Bellezza, 1984), but that are nevertheless generated by 
other participants. Thus, a mixed effects logistic regression analysis was run to investigate to 
what extent the particular properties that a person generated (i.e., the individual properties) 
contribute to his/her own particular category judgment. 
The analyses were carried out in R (version 3.1.2) using the lme4 package (Bates, 
Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). Category judgment of a given individual to a given 
exemplar, a binary variable, was included as the response of interest and two fixed effects 
were included. The first one comprised the individual property applicability scores (i.e., based 
on the set of properties that that specific participant generated, see Figure 2) and the second 
predictor contained the residual property applicability scores (i.e., based on the properties that 
were generated by the other participants, see Figure 2). For each participant × category 
combination, we z-transformed both the individual and residual property applicability scores. 
In addition, category level (basic and superordinate levels of a category) and domain 
(clothes, fruit, musical instruments, and vehicles) were included as dummy-coded covariates 
(these effects are not the main interest of the analyses). Random effects for participants and 
items (i.e., the 120 different pictures) were also included. Following the suggestion from Barr, 
Levy, Scheepers, and Tily (2013), the random effects structure was maximal except when it 
concerned the control variables category level and domain, and random correlations were 
excluded as well5. The analysis revealed that individual properties have a significant 
contribution to the prediction of the person-specific category judgments (β = 0.87, SE = 0.16, 
χ²(1) = 20.20, p < .001). This might lead to the conclusion that people’s own properties are 
                                                          
5 The analysis code can be found on Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/8vewz/).  
19 
 
directly linked to their category extension. We also found a significant effect of the residual 
properties (β = 2.02, SE = 0.26, χ²(1) = 50.70, p < .001). This means that properties that 
participants did not generate also play a role in predicting category judgment.  
However, if all properties are (to some extent) predictive for category judgments, it 
shouldn’t be a surprise that we found a significant effect of the individual property 
applicability scores in the previous analyses. Indeed, these results did not prove that one’s 
own properties are special. Thus, in an additional analysis, we sought to compare how well a 
person’s properties predict their own category judgments as opposed to other people’s 
category judgments. To examine whether intension predicts extension at the individual-
specific level, we conducted a similar analysis, except that we now shuffled the category 
judgments of all participants. That is, each participant’s individual property applicability 
score was paired with another participant’s category judgments. For example, the category 
judgment scores of Participant 1 were paired with the individual property applicability scores 
of Participants 2, 3, 4,…., or 16 (there were 16 participants in total – see Table 4 for a 
simplified illustration). In the previous analyses a person’s category judgments were predicted 
by the specific properties she generated and the properties generated by the remaining 15 
participants. Now, a person’s category judgments will be predicted by a different person’s 
properties and the 15 other participants’ properties. The latter entails that a person’s own 
properties are now included in the residual property applicability scores. 
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Table 4 
Illustration of the shuffling procedure used in the mixed effects logistic regression analysis for 
Study 1 and Study 2. The colored boxes indicate the shuffle moves. Note that in Study 1, the 
property applicability scores were based on the generated properties, whereas in Study 2 
were based on the property judgments. 
participants items category 
Category 
judgments 
Category 
judgments shuffled 
Individual 
prop-app 
Residual 
prop-app 
pp 1 item 1 Category 1 1 1 26 99 
pp 1 item 2 Category 1 0 1 28 93 
pp 1 item 3 Category 1 1 1 27 97 
pp 2 item 1 Category 1 1 1 13 112 
pp 2 item 2 Category 1 1 0 11 110 
pp 2 item 3 Category 1 0 1 10 114 
pp 3 item 1 Category 1 1 1 15 110 
pp 3 item 2 Category 1 1 1 12 109 
pp 3 item 3 Category 1 1 0 10 114 
 
A similar mixed effects logistic regression analysis was again run, but this time, 
instead of using category judgment as the dependent variable, we used the shuffled category 
judgments data as the response of interest. We repeated this procedure for 1,000 random 
shuffles of the category judgment data. Each time we compared the regression weights 
obtained from this model with the regression weight obtained from the previous analysis (i.e., 
using the original non-shuffled category judgment data). If there is a link between someone’s 
category intension and extension, we would expect that the regression weight of the 
individual property applicability scores would be higher in the original analysis compared 
with the shuffled data. In contrast, we expect that the regression weight of the residual 
property applicability scores would be higher with the shuffled data, because a participant’s 
own properties are now actually included in the calculation of the residual property 
applicability scores. We found that for 98.69% of all the simulations, as expected the original 
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regression weight of individual property applicability scores was higher than the one obtained 
using the shuffled data. We also found that in 97.78% of all the simulations, the regression 
weight of residual property applicability scores was lower than the one obtained using the 
shuffled data6. Taken together, these results do provide evidence that there is a relation 
between people’s category extensions and their intensions, for certain categories at least.  
 
Study 2 
In order to replicate and extend the findings of Study 1, Study 2 was conducted using a 
larger sample (i.e., 80 participants and 24 exemplars per category). The same methods, 
correlating extension and intension similarity matrices and mixed effects logistic regression 
analyses, were again used to examine the extension-intension relation. There were a few 
differences compared to Study 1. First of all, we employed a property judgment task instead 
of a property generation task to measure category intension, and hence the calculation of the 
property applicability scores was slightly different from Study 1. The reason was that, during 
a property generation task, people may forget to mention certain properties or give properties 
they are not actually using when judging category membership. Although their own properties 
may still predict their category judgments to some degree, there is ample room for 
improvement. The latter statement is supported by the finding in Study 1 that residual 
properties (i.e., properties generated by other individuals) were predictive for person-specific 
category judgments too. In other words, the few properties a person generates play a role in 
their category judgments, but properties they do not generate are an even bigger factor. The 
notion that people fail to generate some crucial properties may make it difficult to obtain a 
reliable intension similarity matrix. As found in Bellezza’s (1984) study, the test-retest 
reliability of generating properties for category terms can be quite low. He argued that since 
                                                          
6 In some cases the shuffling caused convergence problems during the mixed effects logistic regression analysis. 
These were removed from the analyses.    
22 
 
there is no well-defined meaning of a word, it is difficult to retrieve the same information on 
different occasions. This could in turn explain why we did not find a correlation between 
extension and intension similarity matrices.  
So, in order to address the concern that people cannot consciously access all relevant 
properties that they employ to define a concept, we used a property judgment task instead of a 
property generation task. If people tacitly “know” which properties to use when making a 
category decision, they may be able to recognize them in a property judgments task even 
though they (partly) fail to retrieve them during a property generation task.  
A second difference with respect to Study 1 is that we now added a filler task (i.e., 
solving analogies), between the property judgment and category judgment task, in order to 
eliminate or at least reduce any potential carry-over effect. Finally, we selected three different 
categories for this study, from Verheyen and Storms (2013), which were also used by H&P 
(as opposed to the eight categories used in Study 1): insects, tools, and sciences. The 24 items 
per category, including clear members, clear non-members, and borderline cases, were also 
taken from Verheyen and Storms as were the property applicability matrices. This study was 
pre-registered on Open Science Framework (OSF, https://osf.io/bqekx/), and all data and 
analysis code, can be found using this link (https://osf.io/8vewz/). 
 
Method 
 Participants. Eighty participants (50 females), ranging in age from 18 to 32 years old 
(Mage = 19.05) performed a property judgment task and a category judgment task. They 
participated voluntarily or received study credit for their participation. Five participants 
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unexpectedly showed no variability in their property or category judgments for at least one 
complete category, so they were excluded from the analyses7.  
Materials. As in H&P, the materials were taken from Verheyen and Storms’ (2013) 
study. In the latter, eight categories were used, representing four different category types 
(animals: fish and insects; artifacts: tools and furniture; activities: sports and sciences; and 
borderline artifact-natural-kind categories: fruit and vegetables). To keep the task practically 
feasible for participants, we reduced the number of categories to three, based on these criteria: 
(1) we wanted to have one category from each type, except for the artifact-natural-kind group, 
because the category fruit was already included in Study 1; (2) since the main aim of our 
study is to investigate consistency between extension and intension, inter-individual diversity 
is important. To determine this, we used the category judgment data from Verheyen and 
Storms (2013). After case-wise removal of missing data and exclusion of participants without 
any variability in their category judgments, we calculated Cronbach’s alpha and average pair-
wise correlations (i.e., correlations between subject X’s category judgments and subject Y’s 
category judgments). The following categories demonstrated the most inter-individual 
variability (from high to low): sciences, insects, sports, and tools. As we wanted one category 
per type, we ultimately selected sciences (activities), insects (animals), and tools (artifacts).  
Verheyen and Storms selected 24 items per category, comprising clear members, clear 
non-members and borderline cases, all of which were used in the category judgment task. In 
addition, they gathered property generation data as well as property applicability judgments 
for all categories. All resulting properties (i.e., 39 for sciences, 35 for insects, and 34 for 
tools) were included in the property judgment task. In contrast to Study 1, exemplars were 
presented as words instead of pictures. 
                                                          
7 We did not take into account the possibility that some participants would give the same response to all 
questions, which is why this exclusion criterion was not mentioned in the pre-registration plan. Showing no 
variance across items rendered it impossible to compute correlations with other participants. 
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Procedure. Each participant was given a link to an online survey consisting of three 
tasks presented in the following order: a property judgment task, an analogy test (i.e., a filler 
task), and a category judgment task. Participants were tested in one session. 
In the property judgment task, participants were shown a list of properties underneath 
a category name. They were asked to judge whether each property was true for that category 
name by clicking a “yes” button or a “no” button. They could only continue to the next 
category if they had given a response to all the properties. The order of the categories and the 
properties within a category were randomized for each participant. 
A similar procedure was used in the category judgment task. However, instead of a list 
of properties, participants were shown a list of exemplars (presented as words) and they had 
to judge category membership of each exemplar by clicking a “yes” button if they thought 
that the exemplar belonged to that category or a “no” button if they thought it wasn’t a 
member of the category. They had to give a response to all 24 exemplars before they could go 
on to the next category. Each participant received a different random order of categories and 
exemplars within a category. 
The analogy test consisted of 10 multiple choice questions such as “wrist : elbow :: 
ankle : ? ”  (where the correct response was knee in this case). All tasks were conducted in 
Dutch and none of the tasks had a time limit. 
 
Results 
Extension similarity matrix. Again, category judgments were quantified by giving a 
score of 0 or 1, based on whether the item was judged a non-member or a member of the 
category. Table 5 shows the mean and standard deviation of the category judgments scores 
(the proportion of yes responses) per category. Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients for 
the category judgment scores were .99, .99, and .98 for the categories insects, tools, and 
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sciences, respectively. A participant by participant (75x75) similarity matrix was then 
constructed for each category with the correlations between participants’ category judgments. 
 
Table 5 
Mean and standard deviation of category judgement scores and property judgement scores 
per category in Study 2. 
 Category judgments Properties judgments 
M SD M SD 
Insects 0.58 0.14 0.74 0.14 
Tools 0.61 0.16 0.76 0.12 
Sciences 0.73 0.14 0.81 0.07 
M 0.64 0.15 0.77 0.11 
 
Intension similarity matrices. Two intension matrices were constructed, the first one 
was based on property judgments and the second one was based on property applicability 
scores. To construct the first matrix, the property judgments were quantified by giving a score 
of 1 if the property was judged to apply to the category and a score of 0 if not (see Table 5 for 
the mean and standard deviation of the property judgments, expressed as the proportion of 
properties judged to be true of the category). These scores were then tabulated for each 
participant in each category. Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients for the property 
judgment scores were .96, .97, and .97 for the categories insects, tools, and sciences, 
respectively. A participant by participant (75x75) similarity matrix was constructed for each 
category by correlating participants’ property judgment scores, which we will call the 
“property judgment similarity matrix”. 
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To construct the second intension matrix, a similar procedure as in Study 1  was 
employed to compute the individual summed property applicability scores (see Figure 4), 
only this time, the property scores were taken from Verheyen and Storms (2013). Unlike 
Study1, the individual properties were those properties that were considered to apply to a 
category according to a particular participant. Using these individual properties, summed 
property applicability scores were then calculated by adding the property applicability scores 
for the properties of each of the 24 exemplars separately. A 75x75 similarity matrix was 
constructed with the correlations between participants’ summed property applicability scores. 
This matrix will be termed the “property applicability similarity matrix”. 
 
 
Figure 4. Calculating the property applicability scores in Study 2. 
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Correlation between similarity matrices. As in Study 1, the similarity matrices from each 
task and each category were correlated. Before doing so, the central tendency and variability 
of the similarities was first checked. Table 6 shows the average of each of the three similarity 
measures per category, whereas Figure 5 shows the distribution of these measures across all 
categories. Spearman’s non-parametric rank-order correlations were again used to measure 
the relation between extension and intension, since our data were non-normally distributed 
(with skewness of the similarities from the category judgment, property judgment, and 
property applicability matrices: -0.19, -0.12, and -2.81, respectively). 
 
Table 6 
Average of each of the three similarity measures per category in Study 2. 
 Category 
judgments 
Property 
judgments 
Property 
applicability 
Insects .58 .23 .96 
Tools .47 .29 .96 
Sciences .46 .34 .99 
M .50 .29 .97 
 
28 
 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of the similarity measures for each matrix in Study 2 (based on the 
category judgments, property judgments, and property applicability matrices), collapsed 
across the three categories.  
 
Table 7 shows the correlations between the extension similarity matrix and the two different 
intension matrices per category. Collapsing across categories, the mean correlations were 
again found to be close to zero (see the first and third columns of Table 7 under the 
subheading “Within-category”): M = .03 for property judgments and M = .06 for property 
applicability8. These results, again, confirm H&P’s findings, suggesting that there is no 
(strong) link between a person’s category extension and his/her intension. 
  
                                                          
8 Because people presumably endorsed properties that they may have failed to come up with during the property 
generation task (Study 1), the resulting applicability scores are more similar. However, the results showed 
comparable correlations with the other measures of intensional similarity (.41 in Study 1 and .37 in Study 2), 
mitigating concerns about potential ceiling effects. The high values should not come as a surprise, given that 
people generally agree on category extension (see Verheyen & Storms, 2013 and the high Cronbach's alpha for 
category judgment). 
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Table 7 
Spearman rank-order correlations in Study 2 between similarity matrices for category 
judgments, property judgments, and property applicability. 
 Category judgments- 
Property judgments 
Category judgments - 
Property applicability 
Property judgments- 
Property applicability 
 Within-
category 
Between-
category 
Within-
category 
Between-
category 
Within-category 
Insects .06
* .01 -.07* -.02 .36* 
Tools -.02 .09
* .16* .15* .16* 
Sciences .07
* .02 .09* .09* .60* 
M .03 .04 .06 .07 .37 
*correlation is significant at the .05 level  
 
Predicting category judgments from individual properties. A mixed effects logistic 
regression analysis was again run to investigate to what extent the properties that a person 
considers applicable to a category (i.e., the individual properties) can predict his/her own 
category judgment. Analogous models as in Study 1 were used in the analyses. Category 
judgment was the response of interest and two fixed effects were included. The first one 
consists of the individual property applicability scores (i.e., based on the properties that apply 
to a category according to a participant), and the second one contained the residual property 
applicability scores (i.e., based on the properties that were not endorsed by a given 
participant). These can be considered residual properties because they were responses from 
participants in Verheyen and Storms’ (2013) property generation task. For each participant × 
category combination, we once again z-transformed both the individual and residual property 
applicability scores. In addition, category (with levels insects, tools, and sciences) was 
included as a covariate and the same random effect structure as in Study 1 was used. 
The analysis revealed that individual properties contribute significantly to the 
prediction of the person-specific category judgments (β = 2.11, SE = 0.22, χ²(1) = 67.00, p < 
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.001), whereas the residual properties did not (p = .30). These findings seem to support the 
conclusion that people’s set of properties are directly linked to their category extension. They 
also suggest that, when presented with potential properties, participants are able to select 
those properties that drive their category membership judgments. In contrast, when people 
have to generate properties themselves, as was the case in Study 1, they only come up with a 
subset of all properties that they actually take into account when making category 
membership decisions. That is probably why residual properties significantly predicted 
category judgments in Study 1, but not in the present study.      
Finally, the same shuffling procedure as in Study 1 (see Table 4) was run to compare 
how well a person’s intension predicts her own category judgments as opposed to other 
people’s category judgments. The results showed that the original regression weight of the 
individual property applicability scores was higher than the one obtained using the shuffled 
data in 100% of the simulations. Similarly, the regression weight of the residual property 
applicability scores was lower than the one obtained using the shuffled data in 99.90% of the 
simulations. These results strongly suggest that there is a relation between people’s category 
extensions and their intensions. 
 
General Discussion 
Across two studies, we investigated the relationship between category extension and 
intension in eleven semantic categories. It is often tacitly assumed that there is a (strong) 
extension-intension link, yet, a recent study by H&P called this hypothesis into question. 
They found that systematic inter-individual variability in extensional beliefs did not 
significantly correlate with inter-individual variability in intensional beliefs.   
Because of the theoretical importance of these findings, we sought to extend H&P’s 
findings using other measures of category extension and intension. To capture category 
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intension we asked participants to describe categories based on their own perspective (Study 
1) or to judge whether a set of properties are true for a particular category (Study 2). In 
addition, instead of typicality judgments, we used a category judgment task to measure 
individuals’ category extensions. Although typicality judgments are a common and valid 
measure of category extension, it is a gradual measurement that allows members of a category 
to vary in how good they are as an example of a category or how typical they are of the 
category. On the other hand, category judgment is a more decisive binary measurement, 
which might capture different information. More specifically, H&P raised the possibility that 
different properties may determine category membership as opposed to typicality. So to rule 
out the possibility that H&P’s findings were merely caused by the use of typicality ratings, we 
employed category judgments as a measure of extension. 
Using H&P’s method (i.e., correlating extension and intension similarity matrices) in 
both studies, we found evidence suggesting that similarity between individuals for extensional 
judgments did not map onto similarity between individuals for intensional judgments. These 
findings indicate that H&P’s results were not merely a product of the particular intensional 
and extensional measures they used. So contrary to popular belief, it may appear that there is 
a disconnection between category extensions and intensions. However, H&P’s approach is a 
bit unconventional as it does not directly compare an individual’s intension with her 
extension. As we will discuss later, the nature of this procedure brings about some 
methodological concerns that may invalidate their conclusions.    
 
A match made in heaven after all? 
  In a follow-up analysis, we directly related people’s category judgments to the 
properties they themselves generated or endorsed for a certain category. The latter analysis, 
however, provided evidence in favor of a link between intension and extension. That is, the 
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properties a person generated (Study 1) or endorsed (Study 2) were generally a better 
predictor of her category judgments than of the category judgments of other people. The 
question is, why do both approaches, using the same dataset, lead to conflicting findings? And 
what should we actually conclude about the relation between a person’s category intension 
and his/her extension? 
We see three possible explanations for these differences. First, even though the 
reliability coefficients for the property applicability judgments were high (e.g., in Study 1, 
they varied between 78 and .90), there seems to be some disagreement among participants as 
to which properties apply to which exemplars. This could be an issue for H&P’s method, 
because two people with the same category intension, may disagree about which exemplars 
possess certain properties resulting in (partly) different category extensions (and vice versa). 
Thus, intensional similarity does not necessarily translate into extensional similarity. Note 
that every participant with “atypical” property applicability views can influence N - 1 data 
points in the property applicability similarity matrix (i.e., all similarities with the other 
participants). This could be one of the reasons why both H&P and the present study showed 
non-significant correlations between intensional and extension similarity.  
On the other hand, the mixed effects logistic regression method might not be affected 
by idiosyncratic property applicability views to the same extent. If a person holds 
unconventional beliefs about which exemplars possess which property, her individual 
property applicability scores will be inaccurate. Whereas the appropriate, yet unknown, 
property applicability scores of that participant may predict her category judgments, the 
derived applicability scores may not. This would in turn decrease the fit of the mixed effects 
logistic regression model, but the relation between the derived applicability scores and the 
category judgments will still hold for the average person. Hence, the regression weight of the 
person-specific properties will differ significantly from zero, as was the case in both Study 1 
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and 2. Furthermore, because the subsequent shuffling procedure considers all participants 
simultaneously, atypical participants will literally get lost in the shuffle. That is to say, if the 
category judgments are shuffled, nothing changes for participants whose derived applicability 
scores are an imperfect reflection of their true applicability scores: on average, the derived 
applicability scores will predict someone else’s category judgments equally badly compared 
to their own category judgments (or even slightly worse). The story is different for the other 
participants (the majority in all likelihood), whose derived applicability scores more 
accurately reflect their true applicability scores. On average, their derived applicability scores 
will predict someone else’s category judgments considerably worse than their own, assuming 
of course that there is an intension-extension link and inter-individual variability in both 
measures. So that is probably why, as a whole, individual property applicability scores are a 
better predictor of one’s own category judgments as opposed to someone else’s judgments. 
More generally, because this procedure considers all participants at the same time, it is 
probably more likely to detect subtle effects. 
A second reason why the two approaches may lead to different conclusions has to do 
with the reliability of the similarity matrices. More precisely, the correlation between the 
extension and intension similarity matrices is necessarily constrained by the reliability of the 
two matrices. Our data do not allow us to estimate the reliability of the similarity matrices 
(since, unlike H&P, our participants performed every task just once), but in H&P’s data, the 
reliability estimates were rather low (ranging from .18 to .51). If one takes this unreliability 
into account, for instance by applying Spearman’s correction for attenuation formula, the 
resulting correlations are considerably higher. On average, the resulting corrected correlation 
was .35, which seems to suggest that there might be a (weak) relation between extension and 
intension after all. On the other hand, H&P’s meta-analysis of their effect sizes suggested a 
95% CI for the correlation of between +0.1 and -0.1 which is a very small effect. 
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Finally, based on the literature (Ameel et al., 2008; Malt et al., 1999), there is arguably 
no perfect link between extension and intension. This notion likely compounds the reliability 
issue. If on the one hand, the extension and intension similarities are not very reliable, and on 
the other hand, the link between extension and intension is, at the very least, imperfect, one 
may have trouble finding significant correlations between the intension and extension 
similarity matrices. Furthermore, there may be inter-individual variability in the extension-
intension link. Put differently, some people may be very consistent in their category 
extensions and intensions, whereas other people may have a weaker link between their 
extensions and intensions. In conclusion, the present study confirms H&P’s results in that 
extensional similarity does not necessarily map onto intensional similarity. Taken at face 
value, they may challenge the long-held belief that there is a direct, but perhaps imperfect, 
relation between category intension and extension. However, the method of correlating 
intensional and extensional similarity matrices is a rather indirect way to test whether 
intensions and extensions are connected. The outcome critically depends on a) agreement 
about which properties apply to which exemplars, b) the reliability of both similarity matrices, 
c) the strength of the extension-intension link, and d) inter-individual variability in the 
strength of the extension-intension link. The combination of these factors might result in very 
low and even negative correlations (the latter due to random noise). In contrast, directly 
predicting a person’s category judgments from the properties she generated or endorsed does 
not suffer (to the same extent) from these issues. Using this, presumably more sensitive 
method, we did find a significant relation between a person’s category intension and his/her 
extension, indicating that properties are important even though they might not tell the whole 
story (Ameel et al., 2008; Malt et al., 1999). 
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